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Plain Text of a Statute Controls

Plain Text of a Statute Controls  By Chris Micheli California courts do not substitute the wording of the Legislative Counsel's Digest or any extrinsic evidence for the plain text of a statute. That is because, under the established rules of statutory interpretation in California, the plain text of the statute governs whenever its language is clear and unambiguous. The courts of this state follow a three-step hierarchy. California courts follow a strict, sequential process when interpreting laws (as outlined in landmark cases like Halbert's Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) , which is set forth below:   The Plain Text First: Judges examine the actual words enacted into one of California’s 29 Codes. If the language has a plain, clear meaning, the inquiry ends, and the court applies it exactly as written. Extrinsic Aids: Only if the text is found to be ambiguous (meaning that the statutory language is susceptible to more than one rea...
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Why Intrinsic Evidence Is the Superior Use of Legislative History

Why Intrinsic Evidence Is the Superior Use of Legislative History  By Chris Micheli             Based on the seminal California Third District Court of Appeal decision in Kaufman & Broad v. Precision Plastering , the courts in this state have discerned between cognizable (which is subject to judicial notice) legislative history and noncognizable (which is not accepted). The key requirement under the Kaufman & Broad decision is that the legislative history be shared with the Legislature as a whole so that it can be properly viewed as the collective intent of the legislative body.             As a result of this court decision, specific types of legislative history acceptable to the courts are listed, from committee and floor analyses to opinions of the Legislative Counsel and reports of the California Law Revision Commission. In light of this court decision and ...
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Codifying Canons: Should California Formally Define its Rules of Interpretation?

Codifying Canons: Should California Formally Define its Rules of Interpretation?  By Chris Micheli             Unlike some states that have a robust, codified "Code Construction Act," California spreads its interpretive rules across random segments of a number of the 29 Codes, including the Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure, as well as decades of judicial precedent.             Unfortunately, what I have seen for many years is essentially a practical disconnect between bill drafters using general legislative drafting guidelines to pass laws and courts using distinct judicial canons to interpret them. And, the more I delve into statutory interpretation, the more I am confronted from a legislative drafting perspective whether interpretive guidance should be provided to the courts in this state by placing additional directives in statute. The California courts alrea...
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Tension Between Legislative and Judicial Branches on Statutory Interpretation

Tension Between Legislative and Judicial Branches on Statutory Interpretation  By Chris Micheli             Is there a natural tension between the legislative and judicial branches of state government on statutory interpretation? I suggest that there is an inherent tension between the two separate, but co-equal branches. Why?             Recently I came across the following provision in a bill from the 2026 California Legislative Session:   This paragraph shall not be interpreted to require coverage as provided in Division 7 (commencing with Section 16000) of the Vehicle Code. While the Legislature occasionally puts in state statute these types of provisions (another common one requires a statute “to be liberally construed”), as a practical matter, the legislative branch cannot tell the judicial branch how to interpret the law (because the role of the judiciary...
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Considering Legislative Statements with Unambiguous Statutes

Considering Legislative Statements with Unambiguous Statutes  By Chris Micheli             As a general rule, California courts only consider extrinsic evidence (such as committee or floor analyses) when a statute is ambiguous. In other words, if a statute is clear, then the plain meaning of the language controls and there is no reason to consult other evidence of legislative intent. However, I raise the question whether legislative statements, such as findings and declarations, that are codified or uncodified by the bill adding or amending the statute at issue in litigation be considered by the courts regardless of whether the language is “ambiguous” to them. In other words, even if a statute is “unambiguous,” (although if it is that abundantly clear, why would there be litigation?) should the courts review legislative findings and declarations or statements of legislative intent in order to ensure that the court’s inter...
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Statutory Exemptions from the Public Rulemaking Process

Statutory Exemptions from the Public Rulemaking Process  By Chris Micheli             Why does the California Legislature continue to adopt partial or full exemptions in statute from the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)? A fundamental purpose of both the federal and California Administrative Procedure Acts is to allow public participation, including notice and comment, in the federal and state rulemaking processes. The only regulations that do not fall under the purview of the APA are those carved out by a statutory exemption. Providing notice to the public of the proposed rulemaking, as well as an opportunity to be heard during the rulemaking process, is key to having meaningful public participation in the quasi-legislative actions of executive branch agencies, departments, boards, commissions, and bureaus. And there are over 200 of those entities in California statute government. However, with any exemption from the f...
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Supreme Court Cited a Lobbyist’s Memo as Legislative History

Supreme Court Cited a Lobbyist’s Memo as Legislative History  By Chris Micheli             As a general rule, California courts exclude or heavily discount statements by lobbyists as cognizable legislative history when interpreting ambiguous statutes. Based upon the landmark decision in Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. decided by the Third District Court of Appeal, California courts restrict cognizable legislative history to documents that shed light on the collective, objective intent of the Legislature as a whole, rather than subjective or unilateral opinions (which a lobbyist’s point of view likely represents).             As a result of the Kaufman decision, unilateral letters, testimony, or position papers submitted by lobbyists, individual interest groups, or private proponents or opponents are typically viewed as expressions...
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