Should California Codify Additional Interpretive Directives?

Should California Codify Additional Interpretive Directives? By Chris Micheli

The more I delve into statutory interpretation, the more I am confronted from a legislative drafting perspective whether interpretive guidance should be provided to the courts in this state by placing additional directives in statute. The California courts already use a number of judicial principles when interpreting ambiguous statutes.

As a general rule, our courts rely upon the plain meaning of the statutory language. However, when there is ambiguity, the judiciary will turn to the goal of determining the intent of the Legislature. As a result, it raises with me whether the Legislature should codify this goal and others for the courts to follow when interpreting an ambiguous statute (i.e., when statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation).

In other words, should California have in statute this goal, as well as other interpretive directives for the state judges and justices to follow? For example, Minnesota Statutes codify this stated goal as follows: “The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” California could adopt a similar statute and add this as a section to each of the 29 Codes.

In case readers are not aware, California statutes already provide a number of these interpretive guidelines. For example, in almost all of the 29 California Codes, there are general or preliminary sections that provide guiding principles to the judicial branch of state government when interpreting statutes. Government Code Section 9603 specifies that the general rules for the construction of statutes are contained in the preliminary provisions of the different codes. For example, the Codes all contain a section that specifies: “’Shall’ is mandatory and ‘may’ is permissive.”

Of course, the notion of codifying statutory interpretation principles in state law also raises the fundamental question of whether the judiciary should consider indicia of legislative intent. Legislative history and intent has long been a hotly debated topic in judicial and academic circles when it comes to statutory interpretation, particularly at the federal level.

But this suggested approach would address that debate head-on by having the legislative branch of state government provide the judicial branch with guidance on how to proceed with statutory interpretation. Yes, it is understood that the judiciary would not be bound by these legislative pronouncements, just as some of these codified principles are ignored today.

Why is that? Because, while the legislative branch is charged with the lawmaking authority, the judicial branch in this state is charged with interpreting the laws. And, judges and justices get to use, among other things, “canons of statutory interpretation” (i.e., common law or judge-made law) in doing so.

There is another school of thought, however, that the judicial branch is bound by all statutes, and would be as well by statutes that direct how legislative enactments are to be interpreted. For example, a provision found in several hundred state laws today is for a particular statute to be “liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.” If that statutory provision binds the judiciary, then why wouldn’t a statute that mandates judicial use of legislative history materials, for example, also be binding?

California’s judiciary always begins their interpretation of a statute by considering its plain or ordinary meaning. The judicial branch turns to other interpretational aids when it finds ambiguity in the statute. California could even codify these principles. In fact, some states have codified the plain meaning rule, which California could do as well.

Some states have also codified that legislative history should be used to construe an ambiguous statute to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. This is another interpretation directive that California could enact. In some states (e.g., Minnesota), a statute directs the courts to look to the contemporaneous legislative history, which can include statements made by legislators in debate.

One state uses the following statutory language: “In considering the text of a statute or rule...the following aids to construction may be considered in ascertaining the meaning of the text: (1) the meaning of a word or phrase may be limited by the series of words or phrases of which it is a part; and (2) the meaning of a general word or phrase following two or more specific words or phrases may be limited to the category established by the specific words or phrases.”

More than 30 states codify these two statutory interpretation principles:

 

·       Ordinary usage, which they generally define as following the ordinary usage of terms, unless the legislature gives them a specified or technical meaning.

·       Dictionary definition, which generally means to follow the dictionary definitions of terms, unless the legislature has provided a specific definition.

What are some other interpretive directives that could be codified in California statute? The following are some of the ones I would recommend:

 

·       Plain Meaning Rule.

·       Ascertain Legislative Intent.

·       Review Legislative History (e.g., bill analyses and author statements to understand the purpose).

·       The Whole Act Rule (interpret specific sections in light of the entire statute).

Again, while perhaps not binding on the courts, these codified interpretive guidelines could carry much weight with the courts in this state. Moreover, then our state’s courts could be informed of what the Legislature desires. While the courts will have the final word on interpretation and what a statute actually means, these directives would be a matter of state law and would definitively establish the Legislature's goals concerning how to interpret statutes.