Codifying Canons: Should California Formally Define its Rules of Interpretation?
Codifying Canons: Should California Formally Define its Rules of Interpretation? By Chris Micheli
Unlike some states that have a robust, codified "Code Construction Act," California spreads its interpretive rules across random segments of a number of the 29 Codes, including the Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure, as well as decades of judicial precedent.
Unfortunately, what I have seen for many years is essentially a practical disconnect between bill drafters using general legislative drafting guidelines to pass laws and courts using distinct judicial canons to interpret them.
And, the more I delve into statutory interpretation, the more I am confronted from a legislative drafting perspective whether interpretive guidance should be provided to the courts in this state by placing additional directives in statute. The California courts already use a number of judicial principles when interpreting ambiguous statutes; should those be codified in state law?
California law already provides a number of these codified principles of statutory interpretation. For example, Code of Civil Procedure Section 1859 states: “In the construction of a statute the intention of the Legislature, and in the construction of the instrument the intention of the parties, is to be pursued, if possible; and when a general and particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it.”
As a general rule, our courts rely upon the plain meaning of the statutory language. However, when there is ambiguity, the judiciary will turn to the goal of determining the intent of the Legislature. As a result, this approach to statutory interpretation raises with me whether the Legislature should codify this goal and others for the courts to follow when interpreting a statute.
Why should the California Legislature consider codifying principles of statutory construction? In my view, it will better ensure predictable and consistent legal application and strengthen legislative intent in drafting statutes. This has the practical effect of better aligning lawmakers and judges. When legislative drafters and judges use the exact same codified tools, laws are interpreted more consistently.
When legislative attorneys and the judiciary use the exact same framework to read a law, the resulting interpretation is much more predictable. Codification assures that courts rely on the specific definitions and "tools" intended by the bill drafters, rather than relying on disparate, judge-made common law canons. By providing clear guidance, codification would reduce ambiguity by explicitly telling courts how to weigh text, intent, and extrinsic aids.
As an additional practical effect, it could reduce time-consuming and costly litigation. Ambiguous legal language frequently triggers lengthy court battles. A unified, codified set of guidelines helps clarify ambiguous provisions sooner, reducing the need for disputing parties to litigate what the "plain meaning" or "legislative intent" behind a phrase actually is.
It would also help preserve legislative deference. Under current practices, California courts frequently overlook or downplay general preambles, "findings," or uncodified intent statements, treating them as non-binding. Codifying interpretive directives—such as explicit instructions on when a statute must be liberally construed to achieve its purpose (which California law does in hundreds of individual statutes)—would force the judiciary to grant appropriate deference to the legislative branch's policy goals.
Another concern being addressed by codification is that it would preclude judicial shifts in approaches to statutory construction. Common-law interpretive doctrines are susceptible to changing political and philosophical winds within the courts (such as sudden shifts between purposivism and strict textualism). Codification anchors these rules into statutory law, preventing judges from changing the rules of interpretation midstream and destabilizing existing legal understandings.
Fundamentally, codifying principles of statutory interpretation in California statutes would provide clear, binding rules that create predictability and consistency for the legislature, courts, and regulated public. Also, codified statements that are permanent in law and visible in one place is better than having them scattered among the 29 California Codes or uncodified intent notes (which may be difficult to find without annotations).
Finally, I think this creates a proper level of respect for legislative intent. In other words, it ensures that the judiciary gives appropriate weight to the explicit findings and declared purposes of the elected lawmaking branch. And it guides judges on when and how to look past plain meaning into legislative history or phrases like "liberally construed".
Many other states take this approach. For example, Minnesota Statutes codify the stated goal that “The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”
Other states have codified that legislative history should be used to construe an ambiguous statute to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. One state uses the following statutory language: “In considering the text of a statute or rule...the following aids to construction may be considered in ascertaining the meaning of the text: (1) the meaning of a word or phrase may be limited by the series of words or phrases of which it is a part; and (2) the meaning of a general word or phrase following two or more specific words or phrases may be limited to the category established by the specific words or phrases.”
More than 30 states codify these two statutory interpretation principles:
· Ordinary usage,
which they generally define as following the ordinary usage of terms, unless
the legislature gives them a specified or technical meaning.
· Dictionary definition, which generally means to follow the dictionary definitions of terms, unless the legislature has provided a specific definition.
And, in other states, several canons of statutory construction are the set forth in state law, such as the Plain Meaning Rule and the Whole Act Rule. Some states even require in state statutes that their courts “ascertain legislative intent” or “review legislative history.”
Under California’s
separation of powers doctrine (set forth in Article III, Section 3 of the
California Constitution), the courts will have the final word on interpretative
issues and what a statute actually means. Nontheless, these directives would be
a matter of state law and would definitively establish the Legislature's goals
concerning how to interpret statutes. Hopefully, the judicial branch would
follow them.
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